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When Congress first enacted the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in 1965, 
public officials in South Carolina led the charge to scrap the new statute. Their 
brief to the Supreme Court of the United States described the VRA as an 
“unjustified” and “arbitrary” affront to the “Equality of Statehood” principle, 
and a “usurp[ation]” of the State’s legislative and executive functions.1 Not 
surprisingly, the Warren Court was unpersuaded and opted instead to endorse 
broad congressional power to craft “inventive” remedies to address systematic 
racial discrimination and to “shift the advantage of time and inertia from the 
perpetrators of evil to its victims.”2 South Carolina v. Katzenbach and the 
statutory regime it upheld have remained good law for decades. 
That may change very soon. In Shelby County v. Holder,3 the Justices are 
again considering the validity of the contemporary versions of VRA provisions 
South Carolina first challenged decades ago. South Carolina is again 
participating in the litigation, now as amicus, and is again urging the Court to 
scrap the statute. This time around, the challenge concedes congressional 
power to craft the VRA’s regional provisions, in the first instance, but posits 
that these obligations—known as “section 5”—are no longer constitutional 
today because, as Chief Justice Roberts observed four years ago, “[t]hings have 
changed in the South.”4  
Undeniably, things have changed. Opportunities for minority political 
participation in places like South Carolina have evolved since Congress first 
enacted the VRA. Supporters of the VRA readily acknowledge as much but 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. 
1. Brief for Plaintiff at 4–5, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (No. 22), 
1965 WL 130083, at *4–*5. 
2. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 327–28. 
3. 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (argued Feb. 27, 2013) (No. 
12-96).  
4. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009); see also Brief 
for Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2–3, Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 594 (No. 
12-96), 2013 WL 50688, at *2–*3 (“Section 5 has served a noble purpose, but its remedy is no 
longer justified by the decades-old coverage formula.”). 
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argue that this evolution is less developed, more fragile, and more dependent 
on section 5’s continued operation than South Carolina and others siding with 
the petitioners in Shelby County maintain.5 The pending case accordingly 
presents the Court with competing narratives, one of a problem solved and, 
hence, a statute that has run its course, and another depicting a vulnerable work 
in progress that requires the sustained attention the VRA provides. 
There is, nevertheless, an additional narrative the Justices should consider 
when they evaluate how far places subject to the VRA’s regional provisions 
have evolved. This narrative posits that section 5 is far from obsolete and 
operates not only as a restraint on the ill-intentioned, but also as an affirmative 
tool of governance. On this account, one of the VRA’s most critical, albeit 
least appreciated, functions is the way in which it helps public officials 
navigate complex contemporary questions concerning equality of opportunity 
in the political process.6  
A good example of the VRA’s role in this regard is found in the recent 
dispute over voter identification (ID) in South Carolina. The “evolutionary 
process”7 through which voter ID came to be approved in South Carolina 
shows section 5 operating not only as a constraint, but also as a constructive 
mechanism for dispute resolution. In this capacity, section 5 helped produce a 
voter ID measure which, as one reviewing judge explained, “accomplishes 
South Carolina’s important objectives, while protecting every individual’s 
right to vote and . . . addressing the significant concerns” about the measure’s 
impact on minority voters.
8
  
In other words, section 5 provided a valuable service. It is a service that 
should not be obscured by South Carolina’s stance in the Shelby County case. 
It is, moreover, a service that should fall within Congress’s power to provide. 
I. THE DISPUTE AND ITS RESOLUTION 
Since 1988, South Carolina has required voters to present identification in 
order to vote in person. Under state law, voters were able to meet the ID 
requirement by presenting either a qualifying photographic ID (specifically, a 
South Carolina driver’s license or a photo ID card issued by the state’s 
Department of Motor Vehicles) or a non-photo voter registration card South 
Carolina provided to all registered voters.9 On May 11, 2011, the South 
Carolina General Assembly passed a new law, called Act R54, which seemed 
 
5. See, e.g., Brief for the Attorney General as Appellee at 25–26, Shelby Cnty., 679 F.3d 
848 (No. 11-5256), 2011 WL 6008650, at *25–*27 (outlining repeated congressional findings 
that “jurisdictions covered by Section 5 have engaged in a pattern of suppressing and diluting the 
voting strength of minority citizens”). 
6. See Ellen D. Katz, Democrats at DOJ: Why Partisan Use of the Voting Rights Act Might 
Not Be So Bad After All, 23 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 415, 425 (2012) [hereinafter Katz, Democrats 
at DOJ] (arguing “the VRA’s terms modulate inherently difficult discussions regarding complex 
questions like the distribution of political power by channeling debate through a structured 
inquiry”). 
7. South Carolina v. United States, No. 12-203, 2012 WL 4814094, at *21 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 
2012) (Bates, J., concurring). 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at *2 (majority opinion). 
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to require that only photographic identification would suffice if voters intended 
to vote in person.10 Act R54, however, was not entirely clear on this point.  
The ambiguity arose even though the new law facially banned use of the 
non-photo voter registration card as qualifying identification. Act R54, 
however, also excused voters from presenting photo ID if the voter could show 
that a “reasonable impediment . . . prevent[ed] [him or her] from obtaining 
photograph identification.”11 Notably, Act R54 did not specify what 
constituted a reasonable impediment, or how the local officials charged with 
administering the provision should interpret or apply it.12 The Act, moreover, 
did not specify whether the previously issued non-photo ID cards might be 
used in cases in which a voter established a reasonable impediment to 
obtaining photo ID. 
This lack of specificity gave rise to concern when South Carolina sought 
the federal approval the VRA requires it to obtain before making changes to its 
electoral system.13 Discussions ensued regarding the way in which local 
officials would implement Act R54’s “reasonable impediment” provision, and 
unresolved uncertainty about implementation was a primary reason why the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) denied South Carolina’s request for 
preclearance.14  
In a letter explaining the denial, Assistant Attorney General Tom Perez 
noted uncontested evidence that minority voters in South Carolina were nearly 
twenty percent more likely to lack DMV-issued photographic ID than were 
white registered voters.15 Perez also noted that this disparity would not be 
mitigated by the reasonable impediment provision, “[g]iven the [provision’s] 
ambiguity . . . and uncertainty as to how it may be applied.”16 In fact, the 
exemption’s “vagueness” raised the possibility of inconsistent application “and 
 
10. Act R54, § 5, 2011 S.C. Acts 90, 94–96 (amending S.C. Code Ann. § 7-13-710(D)(1)(b) 
(1976)). 
11. Id. at 95. 
12. South Carolina v. United States, 2012 WL 4814094, at *3–*4. 
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006) (setting forth preclearance process). 
14. See Letter from Robert D. Cook, S.C. Deputy Att’y Gen., to Marci Andino, Exec. Dir., 
S.C. Election Comm’n 4 (Aug. 16, 2011) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). While the 
request was pending, DOJ sought additional information regarding how the provision would be 
implemented, and South Carolina’s Attorney General responded with an opinion defining a 
reasonable impediment to be “any valid reason, beyond the voter’s control which created an 
obstacle to the voter’s obtaining the necessary photographic identification in order to vote,” and 
included some examples. Id. DOJ then asked how local officials would apply this standard, what 
training they would receive in order to do so, and how voters would learn about the standard. 
South Carolina submitted conflicting drafts of training and educational materials but never 
submitted final versions to DOJ. Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant U.S. Att’y Gen. for Civil 
Rights, to C. Havird Jones, Assistant S.C. Deputy Att’y Gen. (Dec. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Perez 
Ltr.] (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
15. Perez Ltr., supra note 14, at 2 (“[A]ccording to the state’s data, . . . minority registered 
voters were nearly 20% more likely to lack DMV-issued ID than white registered voters, and thus 
to be effectively disenfranchised by Act R54’s new requirements.”). 
16. Id. at 3. 
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thus risk[ed] exacerbating rather than mitigating the retrogressive effect of the 
new requirements on minority voters.”17  
Based on these findings, Perez concluded that South Carolina had failed 
to sustain its burden under the VRA to demonstrate the proposed change would 
be nondiscriminatory. DOJ accordingly refused to approve implementation of 
the measure.18  
That decision was a controversial one. While some praised it as well 
founded and justified,19 South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley called the 
DOJ’s preclearance ruling “outrageous, . . . terrible [and] clearly political” and 
pledged “to look at every possible option” to the get the decision overturned 
and “protect the integrity of our electoral process and [South Carolina’s] 10th 
Amendment rights.”20 State Attorney General Alan Wilson announced he 
would fight the decision in court, a move some observers read to signal that a 
constitutional challenge to section 5 was forthcoming and that it would 
leapfrog Shelby County as the vehicle by which the Supreme Court might 
strike down the statute.21 
Litigation did indeed follow, but it was not as fiercely contentious as the 
initial reactions to the DOJ’s decision suggested it would be, nor did it produce 
the sort of sweeping outcome some predicted. It turned out that South Carolina 
opted against a constitutional challenge and instead asked a panel of three 
federal judges in Washington, D.C., to approve Act R54 under the VRA.22 The 
panel heard testimony, collected evidence, and ultimately decided it would 
approve the measure. In so doing, however, the panel made clear that DOJ 
made no mistake in denying preclearance months earlier. Instead, the panel 
explained that its decision to approve Act R54 rested on a construction of the 
statute that only developed during the course of the litigation.23  
Judge Kavanaugh’s lead opinion, which Judges Kollar-Kotelly and Bates 
joined in full, explained that, “[a]s this litigation unfolded, the responsible 
South Carolina officials determined, often in real time, how they would apply 
the broadly worded reasonable impediment provision.”24 The opinion credited 
two specific “responsible” officials, namely, South Carolina’s Attorney 
 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 4 (“Until South Carolina succeeds in substantially addressing the racial disparities 
described . . . the state cannot meet its burden of proving that . . . the voter identification 
requirements proposed in section 5 of Act R54 will not have a retrogressive effect.”). 
19. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Holder’s Voting Rights Gamble, Slate (Dec. 30, 2011), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/12/the_obama_administratio
n_s_risky_voter_id_move_threatens_the_voting_rights_act.html (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (describing partisan responses to DOJ’s blocking South Carolina’s voter ID law). 
20. Charlie Savage, U.S. Cites Race in Halting Law over Voter ID, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 
2011, at A1. 
21. See Hasen, supra note 19 (stating “it now seems pretty likely that the South Carolina 
case will leapfrog over” other pending challenges to section 5). 
22. Complaint at 12, South Carolina v. United States, No. 12-203, 2012 WL 4814094 
(D.D.C. Oct. 10, 2012). 
23. South Carolina v. United States, 2012 WL 4814094, at *6 (approving reading of Act 
R54 as allowing election officials to challenge “affidavit’s factual falsity,” but not “impediment’s 
reasonableness or unreasonableness”). 
24. Id. at *4. 
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General Alan Wilson and the State’s Executive Director for State Election 
Administration, Marci Andino, for generating the construction of the 
“reasonable impediment” provision that became the linchpin for the court’s 
holding.25 
That construction made clear that “all voters in South Carolina who 
previously voted with (or want to vote with) the non-photo voter registration 
card may still do so, as long as they state the reason that they have not obtained 
a photo ID.”26 As Judge Kavanaugh explained, under the approved 
construction, voters must be truthful when offering a reason, but the 
“reasonableness” of the impediment would be left to the voter’s judgment.27 
Neither poll managers nor county boards would be allowed to “second guess” 
the reasonableness of the impediment proffered.28 Any reason asserted by the 
voter, and a host of reasons were documented,29 “must be accepted—and his 
or her provision ballot counted” unless the reason was shown to be false.30 
The grant of preclearance ultimately rested on this construction. To be 
sure, other facets of Act R54 also contributed to the court’s decision that 
preclearance was appropriate. Judge Kavanaugh, for example, emphasized that 
Act R54 made the acquisition of photographic identification far easier than it 
had been previously and contained other provisions regarding notice and 
education that his opinion concluded blunted the measure’s potentially 
exclusionary impact.31 But it was the “expansive” construction of the 
reasonable impediment provision that state officials espoused during trial that 
enabled the panel to approve Act R54. This construction allowed the panel to 
conclude the new voter ID measure changed existing practice far less than one 
might have initially thought32 and explain why it compared so favorably to 
other voter ID provisions that passed muster under the VRA.33  
The panel in South Carolina v. United States accordingly decided to 
preclear Act R54, albeit not for use in the November 2012 election. Judge 
Kavanuagh wrote that insufficient time remained before that election to ensure 
implementation in accordance with the decision.34 In January 2013, the court 
awarded South Carolina limited attorneys’ fees, finding in its decision 
sufficient grounds to deem the State the prevailing party. The panel wrote, 
“South Carolina did not obtain everything it sought . . . [but] undoubtedly 
 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at *3. 
27. Id. at *5. 
28. Id. at *5–*6. 
29. These include having no car, being disabled, lacking a birth certificate, needing to work, 
looking for work, lacking money to make the trip to get ID, caring for one’s children, helping 
one’s family, and doing charitable work. Id. at *5. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at *8. 
32. Id. at *1, *5–*12. 
33. Id. at *15–*17.  
34. Id. at *17–*19.  
60 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW SIDEBAR [Vol. 113:55 
achieved some of the benefit it sought: it obtained preclearance of Act R54 for 
elections in 2013 and subsequent years.”35 
II. “DETERRING . . . AND ENCOURAGING” NONDISCRIMINATION 
In many respects, the South Carolina voter ID dispute offers something 
for everyone. The outcome crafted by the court left the judges praising one 
another and the federal statute they enforced
36
 and all the parties to the 
litigation declaring victory.
37
 Beyond the actual participants, moreover, the 
dispute is one in which the VRA’s critics and supporters alike are able to find 
confirmation of either the statute’s critical importance or its abject 
obsolescence.
38
 For present purposes, three aspects of the dispute are worth 
noting.  
First, the South Carolina voter ID measure approved by the court last 
October is a different measure from the one the state enacted the year before 
and from the one the state would have enacted in the absence of section 5. 
Judge Bates wrote separately to make these points. He observed that “Act R54 
as now pre-cleared is not the R54 enacted in May 2011,” and characterized his 
observation as stating “the obvious.”
39
 The measure, Judge Bates explained, 
had undergone an “evolutionary process,” as measures subject to preclearance 
often do,
40
 and this process yielded a result that “accomplishes South 
Carolina’s important objectives while protecting every individual’s right to 
vote and . . . address[ing] the significant concerns raised about Act R54’s 
potential impact” on minority voters.
41
  
Judge Bates also posited that South Carolina would have enacted a “more 
restrictive” photo ID law had it not been subject to the VRA’s review 
process.
42
 He pointed out that “key ameliorative provisions were added during 




35. Order of Jan. 4, 2013, South Carolina v. United States, No. 12-203, 2012 WL 4814094, 
at *2. 
36. See, e.g., South Carolina v. United States, 2012 WL 4814094, at *2 (describing VRA’s 
remarkable effectiveness); id. at *20 (Kollar-Kotelly, J., concurring) (noting agreement with 
“both the Court’s excellent opinion and Judge Bates’ thoughtful concurrence”); id. at *21 (Bates, 
J., concurring) (praising Judge Kavanaugh’s “excellent” opinion). 
37. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Federal Court Blocks Voter ID Law in South Carolina, but 
Only for Now, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 2012, at A18 (noting both South Carolina’s attorney general 
and Justice Department praised ruling); Del Quentin Wilber, Court Approves South Carolina 
Voter-ID Law but Delays It Until At Least 2013, Wash. Post (Oct. 10, 2012), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-10/national/35500354_1_voter-identification-law-
new-voter-id-law-voter-id-measure (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (same). 
38. See, e.g., Savage, supra note 37 (referencing supporters and opponents praising 
decision); Wilber, supra note 37 (same). 
39. South Carolina v. United States, 2012 WL 4814094, at *21 (Bates, J., concurring). 
40. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 19 (noting process typically occurs through negotiation 
rather than in open court). 
41. South Carolina v. United States, 2012 WL 4814094, at *21 (Bates, J., concurring). 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
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that it was the state’s “evolving interpretations of these key provisions” that 
enabled the court to approve the statute.
44
 
Second, South Carolina’s present voter ID measure is different not only 
from the one the state itself would have passed absent section 5, but also from 
the one the VRA, read most expansively, would have required. The approved 
provision creates new challenges for voters lacking photo identification. While 
a voter presenting a non-photo voter registration card was previously able to 
vote a regular ballot in person without question, that voter is now relegated to a 
provisional ballot and must attest that a reasonable impediment blocked him or 
her from acquiring qualifying photo ID. That reason, moreover, must be 
deemed truthful, if challenged.
45
 In other words, Act R54 makes voting more 
difficult than it had been for voters lacking photo ID, and minority voters are 
disproportionately represented in this group. It does so, moreover, to address a 




For these reasons, South Carolina’s voter ID requirement, even as it 
“evolved,” looks much like the sort of measure the VRA was meant to block 
and much like the sort of measure a federal court would have blocked during 
the early years of the VRA’s operation. The new obligations imposed on voters 
and the increased discretion vested in local officials all sound in retrogression, 
at least as that standard had once been understood.
47
 And yet, by the time the 
South Carolina v. United States panel reviewed Act R54, incremental burdens 
of the sort imposed by the South Carolina measure had been approved in other 
cases.
48
 Far from aberrational, then, South Carolina is the latest in a series of 
decisions that applied section 5 more flexibly than in earlier years. 
This flexibility no doubt stems from the Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
analogy between voter ID and the poll tax, as well as from the Justices’ voiced 
reservations about section 5’s validity.
49
 But it also reflects the changed 
circumstances in which the statute presently operates. This leads to a third 
observation about the case. Namely, Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion in South 
Carolina may be read to suggest that the panel approved Act R54 not only 
because the measure’s substantive terms evolved during the litigation, but also 
because the judges ultimately had confidence that the measure would be 
implemented as interpreted. That confidence stemmed in part from the panel’s 
assumption that the VRA would remain a constraint on state action and that 
federal officials would continue to supervise implementation of the measure. 
 
44. Id. 
45. See id. at *3 (majority opinion) (describing South Carolina law). 
46. See id. at *13 (declaring state’s “interests cannot be deemed pretextual merely because 
of an absence of recorded incidents of in-person voter fraud in South Carolina”). 
47. See, e.g., Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (defining retrogression). 
48. See South Carolina v. United States, 2012 WL 4814094, at *15–*16 (discussing laws in 
other states). 
49. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 201–06 (2009) 
(describing federalism concerns of section 5 but reserving judgment for future case); Crawford v. 
Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 203–04 (2008) (explaining “if a nondiscriminatory 
[voter ID] law is supported by valid neutral justifications,” it should not “suffer the same fate as 
[a] poll tax”). 
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But the panel’s confidence also suggests that the judges thought the state 
officials involved differed from the ones who implemented South Carolina’s 
election laws years ago.  
More concretely, Judge Kavanaugh referred to officials involved as 
“responsible” ten separate times in a relatively short opinion.
50
 To be sure, 
Judge Kavanaugh used the word to make clear that the officials involved were 
the ones authorized by state law to administer provisions they were 
construing.
51
 But the repeated use of the word “responsible,” and the tone of 
the opinion more generally, reads as if the panel understood itself to be dealing 
with state officials who were not only empowered to administer the law as they 
said they would, but who would reliably administer the new regime 
consistently with the terms the court described. That is, these officials were 
“responsible” not only because they were authorized to act, but also because 
they could be trusted to act as they were required. 
“Responsible” in this sense hardly means the state officials involved 
relished the obligations the VRA imposed upon them. But it does suggest they 
understood themselves to be bound by them, and that they would fulfill those 
obligations to the best of their ability. Indeed, in marked contrast to two recent 
section 5 decisions addressing voter ID and redistricting in Texas,
52
 South 
Carolina v. United States never suggests that the state officials involved were 
hostile or resistant to the VRA, or that they harbored ill will towards minority 
voters.
53
 To the contrary, the panel’s confidence that state officials would 
conscientiously enforce Act R54, as expansively construed to comply with the 
VRA, seems to have been a basic premise of the court’s decision to grant 
preclearance.  
This conviction, however, is fodder for critics of the VRA. After all, as 
originally crafted, the preclearance regime is both a reflection of, and a 
response to, the deep and well-founded mistrust with which Congress viewed 
public officials in the Jim Crow South. This mistrust is the primary reason why 
section 5 reverses the conventional burden of proof and posits that electoral 
changes in covered jurisdictions are illegitimate until public officials in these 
regions prove otherwise. It is also why South Carolina and other states 
originally objected so strenuously to the regime. 
And yet, Judge Kavanaugh’s lead opinion in South Carolina v. United 
States reflects little of this mistrust. True, he made very clear that the 
preclearance the panel granted was contingent on the approved construction of 
Act R54 and the court’s detailed and precise understanding of how it would be 
 
50. See generally South Carolina v. United States, 2012 WL 4814094. 
51. Id. 
52. See Texas v. Holder, No. 12-cv-128, 2012 WL 3743676, at *33 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2012) 
(noting state “ignor[ed] warnings” that voter ID law would “disenfranchise minorities”); Texas v. 
United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133, No. 11-1303, 2012 WL 3671924, at *21--*22 (D.D.C. Aug. 
28, 2012) (finding “sufficient evidence to conclude that the [Texas] Congressional Plan was 
motivated, at least in part, by discriminatory intent”). 
53. See South Carolina v. United States, 2012 WL 4814094, at *14 (examining and 
ultimately rejecting failure of one legislator to disavow seemingly racist constituent email as not 
representative of views propelling voter ID measure); see also id. at *21 (Bates, J., concurring) 
(praising state officials for their sound interpretation of statute). 
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implemented.
54
 But, ultimately, Judge Kavanaugh and the panel as a whole 
seemed confident the state officials would act as they said they would.  
Insofar as this confidence was warranted—and it does not facially appear 
misplaced—some will see it as evidence that the section 5 regime has outlasted 
its purpose. After all, if public officials in covered jurisdictions are 
“responsible” in the sense that they are trustworthy, is Congress empowered to 
subject them to the federal oversight the VRA mandates? 
The answer is yes, or at least it should be, and that answer need not deny 
the fact that the categorical mistrust long directed at public officials in covered 
jurisdictions is less justified today than it once was. Undeniably, there are 
public officials today who act in good faith on matters of race in places where 
Jim Crow once ruled. Their existence, however, does not mean that section 5 is 
obsolete or that Congress erred in concluding the statute continues to do 
important work.  
The reason lies in the nature of contemporary racial discrimination and 
the ways in which section 5 operates to address it. Bad actors persist, and 
section 5 operates as a direct restraint on them.
55
 Still, racial discrimination, 
including the sort proscribed by the Constitution, does not require malice on 
the part of every public actor connected with a given policy or even malice 
from most of them. Electoral rules are typically devised and enforced by many 
different public actors, such that even seemingly innocuous policies provide 
space in which both overt discrimination and implicit biases may generate 
substantial obstacles to minority political participation.  
The South Carolina voter ID dispute highlights both this phenomenon and 
the way in which the section 5 regime responds effectively to it. Evidence 
presented at trial suggested invidious intent on the part of at least some 
supporters of the new voter ID measure,
56
 while uncertainty about the 
“reasonable impediment” provision, as originally crafted, left room for 
inconsistent and biased implementation.
57
 That risk, moreover, was 
compounded by uncontested evidence showing minority voters were far more 
likely to lack DMV-issued photo ID than white voters.
58
  
The preclearance process provided the forum in which these concerns 
were evaluated and ultimately addressed. From the start, it forced deliberation 
about the contours and implementation of a new photo ID requirement. It was 
 
54. See id. at *5 n.5, *9 nn.7–8 (majority opinion) (expressing concerns about using statute 
as pretext to exclude, but stressing court’s understanding that state officials would enforce 
“reasonable impediment” consistently with opinion); see also id. at *20 (Kollar-Kotelly, J., 
concurring) (noting expansive interpretation is critical for preclearance and adoption of more 
restrictive reading would constitute change for which federal approval would need to be secured).  
55. See supra note 52 (citing two recent VRA cases in which court rejected changes Texas 
submitted for preclearance); see also Ellen D. Katz, On Overreaching, or Why Rick Perry May 
Save the Voting Rights Act but Destroy Affirmative Action, 11 Election L.J. 420, 430 (2012) 
(noting aggressive stance of Texas legislature shows continued relevancy of VRA). 
56. South Carolina v. United States, 2012 WL 4814094, at *13–14. 
57. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (describing court’s reading of “reasonable 
impediment” provision). 
58. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (describing evidence Justice Department cited 
as justifying denial of preclearance). 
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section 5 that provided the impetus for the legislature to craft the “reasonable 
impediment” provision in the first instance,
59
 and it was section 5 that provided 
the mechanism through which state officials at trial were able, “often in real 
time,”
60
 to refine the measure so that opportunities for bias in implementation 
would be minimized. It was, moreover, through the section 5 framework that 
the court was able to examine and ultimately reject evidence of intentional bias 
in enactment as unrepresentative.
61
  
As Judge Bates explained, the preclearance process did not force South 
Carolina “to jump through unnecessary hoops,” but instead facilitated an 
“evolutionary process” that addressed problematic aspects of the voter ID 
measure.
62
 Through its complex web of substantive norms and procedures for 
their application, the regime provided a forum in which interested and affected 
parties were able to identify, dispute, and ultimately address the burdens a 
proposed electoral rule threatened to impose on minority voters.63  
All of this, notably, occurred pursuant to the VRA, rather than outside the 
reaches of the regime, and it was in this regard that section 5 provided 
additional, albeit largely overlooked, service. As Act R54 progressed through 
the legislature, in communications with DOJ, and in the litigation that 
followed, state officials engaged not in an open-ended inquiry into what 
abstract notions of fairness or equality might dictate, but, instead, in a far more 
concrete and narrow examination of what the VRA mandated. The debate was 
periodically contentious, to be sure, but it was also circumscribed, focusing 
throughout on what federal law required rather than on the broader, more open-
ended question of what is normatively fair.64 
In this way, section 5 operated both as a constraint and as an affirmative 
tool of governance for the officials who crafted and would ultimately 
implement it. That is, section 5 shaped the development of a less burdensome 
policy without forcing state officials to spend political capital convincing the 
skeptical or hostile of anything beyond the measure’s compliance with federal 
law. The preclearance process accordingly guided and tempered a contentious 
debate by providing the terms under which debate would occur and the 
procedures those engaged in it needed to follow.  
The discrimination that originally made section 5 necessary has shaped 
contemporary politics in enduring ways, and it forces public officials to 
confront questions of equality that are inherently difficult to resolve. To the 
extent the preclearance regime helps to structure and temper debate, it provides 
 
59. See South Carolina v. United States, 2012 WL 4814094, at *21–*22 (Bates, J., 
concurring) (noting ameliorative provisions were shaped by need for preclearance).  
60. Id. at *4 (majority opinion).  
61. See id. at *14 (rejecting argument that derogatory email of state House member 
established discriminatory purpose).  
62. Id. at *22 (Bates, J., concurring).  
63. See Katz, Democrats at DOJ, supra note 6, at 423–30 (describing value of VRA as 
framework for dispute resolution). 
64. See id. at 425 (discussing issue in context of Texas voter ID statute). See generally 
Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies After 
Flores, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 725, 735 (1998) (arguing one benefit of “results-based” test for 
discrimination is it avoids “requiring courts to label [anyone] as racist”). 
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vital assistance as a means to address and resolve these conflicts.  
CONCLUSION 
Judge Bates closed his concurring opinion in South Carolina v. United 
States with a sound observation: “[T]he history of Act R54 demonstrates the 
continuing utility of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in deterring 
problematic, and, hence, encouraging non-discriminatory changes in state and 
local voting laws.”
65
 Deterrence and encouragement are apt terms, capturing 
how section 5 of the VRA both constrains and facilitates equality of 
opportunity in the political process. The regime has long provided a necessary 
constraint on the ill-intentioned, and substantial evidence shows that it 
continues to do so. But the regime also provides affirmative assistance in 
tackling the difficult issues that are the legacy of discrimination. The provision 
of such assistance should fall well within Congress’s power to enforce the 
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